This paper examines existing measures taken to protect the coastal zones of the Meditterranean Sea and assesses their success. A summary of the main pressures facing these zones is given, followed by an analysis of the legislation covering coastal zone development in ten countries:
Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that the coastal zones of the Mediterranean are coming under increasing pressure, which in turn is having serious implications for the environment and for the sustainable use of these highly valued ecosystems. All the littoral states have undertaken some measures to try and protect their coastal zones from overdevelopment, or development that is socially and environmentally damaging. The success of these measures, however, is questionable. In spite of well-reasoned and carefully drafted regulations, the pressure has continued to increase. The laws are often ignored by developers who put up illegal units. In this and other ways the regulations are ineffective in achieving the key goals of sustainable development: i.e. development that protects the environment for present and future generations to enjoy.
This background paper is structured as follows. Section II summarizes the changes in the use of 
Increasing Coastal Pressures In The Mediterranean
There is ample documented evidence that the human pressure on coastal resources is increasing. Table 1 gives some basic data for the countries covered in this study. In the 30 years to 2000 densities in coastal areas increased by 49 percent, ranging from a low of 5 percent in Croatia, to a high of 112 percent in Algeria ii . The same period has also seen substantial increases in tourist densities in all countries except Egypt. Values for the others range from 25 percent in Spain to 73 percent in Turkey. In general the North African countries with the fast growing populations are also the ones with the highest rates of growth of coastal densities, including tourism densities (Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey).
We also observe some shift in the relative densities of the population between the coastal zones and the national average. The last column of Table 1 gives the percentage change in this ratio between 1970 and 2000. It shows a relative movement outward for Croatia, France, Italy, Spain and Turkey. In Algeria, Egypt and Israel the density has increased slightly faster on average than it has in the coastal zones. In view of these strong human pressures on coastal zones, it is clear that increased regulations may be warranted to protect the resources. The next section looks at the present regulatory framework and assesses its efficiency.
Regulations Governing Coastlines In The Mediterranean
All the countries reviewed in this study have some form of regulation that applies to coastal areas.
They differ, however, in many respects. Some have specific laws that deal with coastal zones and some expressly forbid construction or development in a 'no build area' that varies from country to country. The definition of what constitutes a littoral zone also varies across countries (the no build area and the littoral zone are not the same). Others rely on the application of general planning laws. Table 2 summarizes the main findings from the review. Considerable illegal construction, more or less tolerated by authorities. Public management of these areas needs strengthening. ICZM is weak because of a plethora of laws and planning instruments that are poorly coordinated. Minor infringements are declining but some major tourist developments remain problematic vis-à-vis the law. Studies are under way to identify areas that need protection but implementation of the plans will need funding which is difficult to get.
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Turkey (3) No
Landward limit is 100 metres and is uniform along the whole coast. Construction prohibited within 50 metres but exceptions are made.
Fines and in principle demolitions are available but they are rarely used.
Implementation of coastal management is very weak. The settlements law has been highly misused for improper developments of secondary housing. 'Local land use plans' are often careless and override urban planning at higher level.
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The main comments are the following:
1.
Six of the ten countries have some form of coastal zone legislation regarding development.
Others rely on the normal land use regulations and apply them to coastal areas as appropriate. There is, however, in almost all countries, an expressed concern that the planning process is not working adequately. ICZM is being hampered by a lack of coordination between the regulating authorities (e.g. those responsible for land and sea and those responsible for different levels of government). The presence of specific coastal legislation does not appear to guarantee a better performance in terms of coastal protection.
2.
The definitions of littoral zones vary. Where a figure is specified it is in the range of 100 metres to as much as 2 kilometres. The non-building zone (setback zone) can be as small as 50 metres and as much as 500 metres. It should be noted, however, that in several countries the ban on construction of dwellings within this zone is not absolute (non dwellings can be allowed if required for safety or provision of essential services). Exemptions are given, although it is not known how frequently this happens.
3.
The sanctions in place are fines and possible demolitions. The latter are rarely used, and in a number of countries some form of amnesty is applied for dwellings that have been in place for some time (e.g. Italy, Spain and France). Tolerance for infringements seems to be high in these three countries and also in Croatia, Tunisia and Turkey.
4.
There is limited information on the efficacy of the regulations. The only quantitative data that could be obtained was for Italy, which indicated at least two major infringements per 2 kilometre of coast per year. Data may be available for other countries but it was not accessible through the databases and websites to which the public has access. This makes it difficult to assess the extent of the problem, but the qualitative reports all reach the same conclusion -i.e. that the regulations are frequently evaded or interpreted in such a way as to suit the developers.
5.
Not all is gloom, however, and there are some indications that things can work. The cases of In Tunisia detailed studies are being undertaken of where protection is most needed and plans in support of these are being drawn up. More generally there is an increasing awareness of the need to make the regulations that manage the coastal zones more effective and more protective of these fragile environmentally stressed areas.
It is not possible to establish how effective the different instruments such as setback policies and other regulations have been in protecting coastal zones. We do not have a detailed assessment of the extent of violation of the setback rule and in any case that would only be a small indication of the status of the coasts: for example with a small setback area, and a policy of intense development close to the sea one can end up with a coastal zone that is substantially developed.
In Figure 1 the percentage of land that is built up within one kilometre and ten kilometres of the sea is given for two years (1990 and 2000) and for three countries: France, Italy and Spain. The graph shows that development in all three Mediterranean countries has increased in both zones over those ten years. The increases are not large in the one kilometre zone (about half to one percentage of the area) but this has also been a time when awareness of the need to protect coastal 3 zones was increasing. More generally, as the data presented in Section II show, the pressure on the coastal zones is not abating. Action is therefore needed to draw up the regulations that exist more effective and to introduce new regulations where appropriate. These are discussed in the last section of the paper.
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Box 1: The Piano Paessagistico in Sardinia
In an interview given to EcoMEDia magazine in April 2007, Renato Soru, president of Sardinia explained that, "in order to stop Sardinia from becoming a continuous coastal sprawl, boost economic development in existing coastal settlements and promote a model of sustainable tourism that ensures the participation of local communities" the Regional Landscape Plan (Piano Paesaggistico Regionale or PPR) was adopted by the Sardinian regional council at the end of 2006.
The aim of the PPR is to meet the objectives of the Integrated Coastal Area Management Protocol (ICAM). The whole territory has been divided into 27 coastal areas and building in most of these has been declared unlawful on any part of the coastline. You can only upgrade what has already been built, and the authorities offer incentives to those willing to improve the architectural and urban quality of existing structures. Furthermore, incentives are being provided for the transformation of holiday homes into accommodation facilities, offering a slight increase in building cubature to bring about the required functional changes.
One of the aims is to prevent development of coastal developments that are only for tourists and that become ghost towns outside the tourist season. Thus tourist infrastructures are only allowed to expand (if at all) if they are integrated with local villages. As Mr. Soru says, "it has now been widely understood that the PPR has nothing against small coastal towns; on the contrary, it is there to protect them and ensure that no one, ever again, can buy a piece of land for a pittance and build another tourist resort in a prime position on the waterfront, turning its back both physically and metaphorically to the community". Presently 87% of second homes are built on the coastline.
Now, a few months after its adoption the PPR is being recognized as a tool for better coastal management although not everything has been smooth going. The original aim to increase capacity for tourism by 80,000 beds is unlikely to be met. Moreover, the plan has led to the stop of several urbanization projects in urban areas, such as Cagliari, generating heavy local conflicts. On the other hand interest in subcoastal settlements is clearly growing, while they used to have very limited appeal in the past.
Slowly people are becoming aware that the value and future of a territory does not depend on what has been built, but on what has not yet been built. President Soru makes no secret of the fact that a plan such as the PPR can only be successful if there is a strong willpower behind the central administration. "Authorities should not only listen to the community, but guide citizens using precise regulations that transcend the interests of a particular territory, whilst offering wide and comprehensive regional scope. Coastal development is a problem that affects the entire Mediterranean region and therefore binding regulations should be imposed for environmental protection". "In my capacity as a citizen -he ends -"I sincerely hope that the Mediterranean will not be transformed into a bath tub with cement walls. If people are left to their own devices that's exactly what will happen. It's simply a matter of time". 
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Values of amenities in coastal zones and of landscapes
Any policy of coastal zone protection and land use planning would benefit from a better idea of the benefits and costs associated with different patterns of land use. The pressure on the coasts is coming from individuals who derive benefits from living near the sea. Yet the same actions are causing external costs in the form of reduced visual benefits and reduced access to others who enjoyed these environmental services before.
The aim of this section is to report on research that has valued such benefits and costs. In the next section the estimates from these studies are used to evaluate plausible but artificial coastal development plans.
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There are a few studies available of the value of coastal landscapes. Here we divide them into those that value a landscape for households that own and occupy or households or hotels that rent property with a sea view, and those that relate to the value of a landscape from individuals who are not occupiers of property on the coast. The latter are divided into people that visit the coast or live in coastal areas but not in close proximity to the sea, and people that want to see the coast preserved but do not visit the coast (the so-called non-use values). Often these two sets of values are in conflict: for owners to capture the value of a sea view means detracting from the value those visitors may get from access to a sea view or access to a beach or may wish to see it preserved for its own sake. The next section reports on how these conflicting values compare and uses them to assess olicy options.
Values Of Coastal Landscapes For Owners Or Occupiers Of Property
The technique most used to value the benefits of visual amenities from property is referred to as the hedonic method, where house price data are used as the basis for calculating premiums placed on houses in locations with different landscape attributes. In this section studies that value coastal and lake views are reported.
Benson et al [1] conducted a hedonic study of the impact of views on property prices in Bellingham, Washington. They found a significant price premium associated with different types of views. They derived seven different categories of views finding a premium of 58.9 percent for an "unobstructed ocean view" down to 8.2 percent for a "poor partial ocean view". A lake view adds less (18.1 percent) than an ocean view in most cases, but lake-frontage is found to add 126.7
percent to house prices -capturing aspects of the recreational amenities that are additional to the amenity value provided by the view itself. This study shows the potential for the use of hedonic 7 analysis to further understanding of the valuation of unimpeded views relative to other types of views.
Fraser and Spencer [2] considered the residential land amenity of an ocean view by a scoring system based on three sub-characteristics of the view based on housing data from 114 sites in Western Australia. The three dimensions they used are degree of panorama, potential loss of view and elevation. The potential loss of view dimension introduces both time and uncertainty into people's valuation. They find that the first two characteristics are dominant over the third, which was therefore not included. They also find diminishing marginal utilities to the purchaser as the level of each of these characteristics increases. A scoring matrix was used to determine the quality of the ocean view for each site. They estimate that for the best views with the lowest likelihood of the view being lost the view adds a premium of an extra 25 percent to the house price. The important point this study makes is that the impact of an ocean view on property will depend on how certain the purchaser is that the view will remain and not be blocked in the future. (See also
Abelson and Markandya, [3] ).
Bond et al [4] investigated the impact of views of Lake Erie on residential property using transaction based house prices. This was an analysis based on building codes, which reflected whether a house had a view or not. Having the desirable view of Lake Erie was shown to add an 89.9 percent premium to the house price. In Europe Luttik [6] used hedonic analysis to identify price premiums for different landscape types in the Netherlands. Using a sample of almost 3000 transactions, Luttik finds a premium for houses in attractive landscape types of 5-12 percent over houses in less attractive landscapes.
Houses overlooking water attract a premium of 8-10 percent, whilst those overlooking open space attract a 6-12 percent premium.
Muriel et al [7] conducted a hedonic analysis for Finestère in France. Using a sample of 185 houses in 2005, they derive a property premium of 78 percent for a house with a good view of the sea compared to one without any view of the sea. They also assess the responsiveness of house prices to distance from the sea, finding an elasticity of -0.087 -i.e. a one percent increase in distance from the sea results in a 0.087 percent decline in property value (at an average distance of 6.5 kilometre). So a house that is 3 kilometres from the sea as opposed to 6 kilometres would have a value that is 4.3 percent higher. One that is two kilometres would have a value that is 6 percent higher. These numbers look rather low but are the only ones we could find that estimated a decay function.
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A study in Israel (CAMP Israel, [8] estimated increased room rates for hotels along the seashore of the country. It found accommodation within 2km of the coast charged rates that were about 39 percent higher than in similar classes of hotels further away from the sea.
Although the results do vary by site, there is some agreement across them. As a rough guide, a property with an uninterrupted ocean view will attract a price premium of between 25 and nearly 100 percent. The premium will be less for a partial view -perhaps a low as 8 percent for a 'poor partial view'. The Israel study estimates hotel premium rates of 39 percent. The 'decay' function with respect to distance from the sea implies a decline in values of about 9 percent for households that are up to one kilometre from the sea as opposed to half a kilometre. There is no doubt, however, that more studies are needed to answer questions about the impact of density of housing and access to the beach on the value of such properties.
Values Of Coastal Views And Access To Non-Property Owners
The VOE Approach
A number of processes can also be used to value coastal views to non-property owners. The most common in the literature is often used to value the recreational amenity of a beach, and is known as the Value of Enjoyment (VoE) method. This is included in the 'Yellow Manual', produced by the Middlesex University Flood Hazard Research Centre (Penning-Rowsell et al [9] ) and recommended by the UK government for valuing coastal protection (Whitmarsh et al. [10] Table 3 .
The Israel study combines travel cost and other revealed expenditure data to estimate the value of beach visits. Its results are discussed further below.
The Marzetti study results in Table 3 Sohngen et al. [13] studied visitors to two beaches in State Parks on the coast of Lake Erie, USA.
One of the beaches is 1 mile (1.61km) long -the longest beach in Ohio -and both beaches have other recreational features nearby, such as hiking trails and fishing vi . They find that the beach with more features has a higher valuation (€31.53) than a site that is more beach-focussed (€19.09).
Polomé et al [14] summarised the literature on coastal defense, and in doing so, developed a benefit transfer function for beach recreation. They found shortcomings in the data arising from studies not presenting the total number of visitors to beaches and numbers of visits per visitor and on-site sample bias. They use 106 observations from 38 different sites in the UK, USA and the Netherlands. The studies were mainly from the 1990s but went as far back as 1975, and were predominantly VoE studies. They find that the average value is around €16 for UK beaches and €22 for US beaches (p.837, both figures have been converted to €2001). There were not enough studies to obtain a value for the Netherlands. However, there is still large uncertainty about these figures. They give the overall average value of informal recreation to be approximately €20 (€2001) per visit (p. 839). They also find that the date of the study makes little difference to the valuation, i.e. studies in the 1970s give similar valuations to later studies. On the other hand the concept of value used such as VoE, WTP etc, is highly significant in determining the result. This could mean that the benefit transfer is flawed, since different types of valuation give different results, or it could be that the differences in value are genuine -the USA studies typically used Consumer Surplus measures whilst the UK typically used VoE.
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The CAMP study in Israel [8] This is significant as it applies in principle to the whole group from which the sample was drawni.e. the 1.6 million households in the country. Thus the gross annual WTP amounts to €15 million. 
Other Non-valuation Approaches
Some information on the value of landscapes affected by development can be gleaned from other landscape studies, not related to coastal landscapes. Arriaza et al [15] This study uses a methodology and is well grounded in the theoretical side of landscape evaluation. However, it is unlikely that the results will be very transferable to coastal areas, since people value different landscapes for different reasons, e.g. positive manmade elements may be valuable in some agricultural landscapes such as Andalucía or the Cotswolds, but on coastlines they would be less welcome.
Another approach to valuing landscapes is that of Dramstad et al. [16] . that in some cases it can enhance the value of a landscape. More work is needed on the valuation of coastal landscapes using this promising framework.
As far as coastal landscapes are concerned a couple of studies have been conducted in the UK and one in Turkey using non-economic approaches. Morgan and Williams [17] asked coastal managers and students to rank 70 beaches in Wales. They found that the number of people on the beach did not significantly affect the scores given to different beaches, but undeveloped beaches 16 scored better than those where anthropogenic structures were present. Beach commercialization had an impact only on the rankings of the students.
The other UK coastal study evaluated beach litter, to see which items were most offensive and which were less so (Tudrof and Williams [18] ). Not surprisingly people found items that were potentially harmful as the most offensive (syringes, gas canisters), followed by sewage related debris ( sanitary towels, condoms). Least offensive were items of natural origin, such as seaweed and driftwood.
The Turkish study (Ergin et al. [19] ) develops measures of coastal scenery based on scores derived from a fuzzy logic analysis. The methodology considers 26 coastal scenic assessment parameters which cover physical and human factors. They find top preferences for beach goers in Croatia and
Turkey were absence of sewage, water colour and absence of noise and buildings. Access to the beach and landscape features appeared fifth and sixth respectively in Croatia.
These kind of rankings could be linked to values of these different features of a beach but that has not been done as far as we can see.
Conclusions on Valuation of Coastal Views and Access
The value of beach access vary according to the services provides and degree of crowdedness.
There appears, however to be range of between €5 and €30 per visitor per year for European studies and €5 to €15 for US studies, if we exclude some outliers. In Israel, representing a lower income country values are also lower, at about €3.5. The Israel study also provides the only nonuse value of conservation of €9.4 per household per year.
While the numbers obtained above are useful, they leave a lot or questions unanswered. We do not know the value of an uninterrupted beach view when simply visiting a coastal area, and how this value is affected by coastal development or other factors relating to the beach. Some of the non-valuation studies provide useful information but it still remains to link it to monetary values.
We also do not know the impact on beach visits when access to the nearest beach is impeded. Do individuals go to another beach further away (thus losing welfare) or do they go the same beach but incur a higher cost?
Modelling Coastal Developments And Comparing Benefits And Costs
In this section the data on values of landscapes are used to evaluate different policy options. Two alternatives are considered: the first is the option of allowing a beachfront to be developed versus maintaining it as an undeveloped area and the second is the option of developing a whole area of coastline against a smaller area that is more intensively developed (i.e. 'ribbon' versus 'cluster' development). In each case a large number of assumptions have had to be made to give the problem enough structure so that it could be analyzed numerically. The main lessons, however, are, more general than the specific models generate. These lessons are drawn out at the end of the section.
Coastal Development Versus Conservation
In this example a beach of length X km is taken. In one case houses or hotels can be built along it of varying intensity. Each house or hotel completely blocks the view of the beach from the road and visually dominates the beach. The occupants of the properties have a complete unobstructed view of the sea and can access the beach at zero cost. Other potential users and visitors to the region currently have unimpeded access to the beach and a clear view of the sea. With the construction of housing or hotels they could face total restriction, partial restriction or no 18 restriction. In each case they will have a reduction in the benefits of the use of the beach, either because a visit now is more costly in time or because they have to go to another beach, further away.
The coastal zone benefits of any development to the new occupants will now be:
Where H is the price of a house with frontage X/N, or the rate for the occupancy of a room in a hotel with such frontage, V is the percentage price premium for a coastal location and N is the number of homes or hotel rooms built along the front. If H is proportional to the size of the frontage (a house or hotel with twice as much land as another has twice the basic price) the total benefits will be independent of the number of homes built x . Note that these benefits are a flow over the lifetime of the building. To compare with the costs it is necessary to convert them into annual benefits at a certain real discount rate r (i.e. the actual discount rate less the rate of inflation).
The loss to existing users will be: L = B.P -B*.P*
Where P people use the beach before development, with an average benefit of €B and P* people use the beach after development, with an average benefit of €B*. For the moment other beneficiaries, such as those who benefit from the view but do not visit the beach are ignored.
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In addition there will be a loss of non-use value to people who do not visit but who prefer to see the coastline preserved un developed.
Giving numbers to these values is difficult but some orders of magnitude are possible. The ranges given in Table 4 can be considered plausible. Two ranges are presented, one representative of housing development in a country such as Italy or France and the other in a country like Israel, which has lower use values for access to beaches. In the first case we assume the development is housing for personal occupation and in the second it is hotels with much higher density of occupation. 
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The results are shown in Table 5 . They are presented in terms of the percentage loss of benefit for existing users. In Case A we assume a lower density development of owner occupied housing.
In this case if the present users lose 5 percent of their benefits, the total loss is €3 million, which is between 6 and 20 times the benefits to the new owners. If the benefit loss is as high as 20 percent the social costs of the project exceed the benefits by between 25 and 82 times. The 'breakeven'
percentage -i.e. the percentage loss of benefits to existing users at which costs and benefits are equal -is 0.2 percent in the low case and 1.4 percent in the high case. The actual loss is not known and would be complicated to calculate, needing a model of household travel costs, increases in costs of access to the present beach and alternative beaches available. But one can gain some idea from the relative numbers in Table 5 . A 5 percent decline in benefits is well below that shown in Table 3 for the Lido Di Dante, where the difference between a developed area and an undeveloped area is 28 percent. A breakeven value of 0.8 percent (the average of the two values in Table 5 ) would imply a loss of €0.16 for a person with a net value of €20 for a visit to the beach. If someone was earning €10 per hour, the value of leisure time could be taken as €3 (a 30 percent of the gross wage is often used as the value of leisure). In this case the increase in time costs imposed by the development would have to be only 3.2 minutes. This is a very low additional cost and makes the case for conservation, with these values, very strong. One should also recall that the losses of benefits to those who do not use the beach but are visually impacted by it are ignored. Including these would make the case even stronger.
Another sensitivity test would be to see how many beach users you would need to make the case for conservation. In the above example the annual number of visits is taken as 3 million (from the Italian Lido Di Dante study). With a loss of 5 percent of beach benefit from the users (which is very modest) one would need only 146,000 visitors a year. More than that and the losses of the 22 users would be greater than the gains from the developers. A number of that magnitude would imply around 1200 visitors a day in the high season (July and August) and 600 visitors a day in the shoulder season (May and June, September and October). In Case B, where we assume a high-density development of hotels along the entire 2.5 km, the calculations are less favourable for conservation. The value of the development is now much higher, with the greater number of occupants (around 657,000 occupants assuming double occupancy and a 60 percent occupancy rate). The losses of benefits to present users have to be around 25 percent for the conservation option to apply. We have assumed a loss of non-use value here of €600,000, based on the figures given in Table 4 . Taking these out of the loss calculation leaves a required loss to users of €2.2 million, or €0.7 per visitor. We assume a WTP of 3. 
Ribbon Versus Cluster Development
Another alternative option to consider would be to compare a 'ribbon' development along the entire coastline with a 'cluster' development, where a limited amount of coastline is taken up in an urban development and the rest is left untouched.
Using the same basic data as in Case A one can assume that the development of the entire coastline of 2.5 km. is replaced by a cluster development that takes up only 500 meters of the coast and extends back to the mainland for a depth of 5 dwellings. So the number of units constructed is the same as in the ribbon development but they are clustered.
The differences with respect to the previous ribbon development are the following:
1. Houses with a restricted view of the sea, in the second tier of houses will have values that are 8-27 percent of the value of houses in the first tier, declining linearly to zero by the last (5th tier). This reflects the fact that they would have limited sea views and would be further from the sea.
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2. Losses to beach users will be lower. Assuming the development is at one end of the beach, losses will be the same those as in the ribbon development for those who used that part of the beach before, and will reduce linearly down to zero for those 2 kilometres from the development. Figure 2 shows the assumed loss of value from the development Figure 2 : Loss of Benefit from Cluster Development
The results are shown in Table 6 . The loss of benefits is much smaller with a cluster development than it is from a ribbon development -60 percent lower in this example. Similarly the generation of benefits is also smaller to owner/occupiers -down by about 67 percent. The conclusion remains, however that even this kind of cluster development has lower benefits than costs. The smaller losses to other users still leave a larger potential loss than the gains to the owners/ occupiers. 
Conclusions And Recommendations For Regulation
This paper looks at the growing pressure on coastal resources from 'artificialization' or conversion of natural habitats into man-made ones. This pressure has been increasing steadily, at least since 1970 and probably from before then. Even since the 1990s when the problem has been recognized and attention devoted to tackling it, the rate of urban development along the coasts has continued to increase in most countries.
The paper surveys briefly the regulations for coastal zone management and finds that integrated management, along the lines being discussed and proposed by researchers working on ICZM, is rarely effective in its implementation. Legislation is now in place in several countries that purports to provide the right regulatory framework, but it is being hampered by a lack of coordination between the regulating authorities (e.g. those responsible for land and sea and those The experience so far indicates that a stricter regime is needed to protect overdevelopment of coastal resources. The practice of amnesties for illegal construction must stop and illegal units should be more frequently subject to demolition. The use of normal planning regulations for land use needs to be buttressed by special conditions that apply to littoral zones that extend beyond the common range of 100-200 metres. In these zones construction should be completely banned. A second zone, perhaps up to one or even two kilometres, should be subject to special permission from an authority that is responsible of ICZM and that supersedes other planning authorities.
Decisions on permitting development in this zone should be part of a strategic plan, in which the external costs and benefits as discussed in this paper are fully taken into account.
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One possible regulatory tool could be the use of transferable development rights. An authority that restricted development in one area would compensate those who lost value as a result of such a restriction by allocating rights in other areas. Such systems have been an effective planning tool in municipalities and districts in the US and elsewhere. Alternatively authorities that were given coastal development rights could share the benefits with those where the rights were denied. Such a system applies in Italy (the so-called 'perequazione urbanistica'). The system has allowed areas to be protected by arranging the transfer of benefits from other areas from as long ago as the early 1980s. (See Box 2).
Box 2
Box 2: Perequazione Urbanistica in Italy
The idea behind the Perequazione Urbanistica is to share the benefits and costs of changes in land use status across communities and individuals. So, if one community or person is given the rights to develop land from agricultural or recreational use to use for dwellings, and another community is restricted not to develop land in this way, the two communities may share the benefits from the increased development.
The scheme works by allocating to all residents in a given area the right to develop a part of their land. Then planning laws are introduced which in effect prohibit the exercise of this right in some places. These laws also define certain areas of land for public useroads, parks etc.
Those who cannot exercise their right by virtue of the planning regulations can sell these rights to others so that they can develop more of their land than their right allocation allows. Where the state needs to acquire land for public use, it does so at the agricultural value of that land, but this still allows the owner to sell the rights to development to another person who needs more than he or she has. In this way no one suffers from a planning restriction.
The scheme has been applied in Italy specially to acquire land for public services with resorting to compulsory purchase under an Eminent Domain law or its equivalent. But it has also been applied to ecologically oriented uses. An example is the case of Cantù (near Como) where it has been used to stop the urbanization of some Greenfield areas. Another is the case of Chiavari (near Genoa) where further development of the hills above the resort town have been deprived of development rights, but these can be exercised elsewhere.
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Another important instrument that can protect coastal development is land taxation. It may be possible to tax increased land values when development rights are accorded for coastal areas and use the revenues for the protection of other areas, including transfers to these areas to make up for restricting development. This serves a similar purpose as the perequazione urbanistica in Italy, except it uses a tax instrument.
In general the authorities should seek to use fiscal instruments such as the above where possible.
Given the difficulties in policing development, and the very strong incentives that individuals have to break the law by undertaking building in violation of planning regulations, it makes it much easier for the authorities to achieve their goals if costs of conservation are shared equitably. That said, some degree of protection of the coasts will always be needed. This can only be achieved if the political will is there.
In any plan for coastal protection there will be positive and negative externalities to account for.
The data available are limited and more needs to be collected on the value of beaches with and without development, the value of coastal landscapes without development and with different types of development, the costs of limited access to beaches and the ways in which beach users respond to increased development. As this paper shows, however, the evidence is strongly in favour of conservation for plausible cases. The benefits to owners and developers of beachfront developments are often smaller than the plausible losses to beach users. Taking account of important non-use values will make the case for conservation even stronger. Finally we note that the losses are much greater from ribbon development than for cluster development. All these results need, however, to be strengthened with further research.
ENDNOTES
i The only littoral states that have not been covered are Albania, Greece, Libya and Lebanon and Morocco. Greece was excluded for reasons of time and the others because of a lack of information.
ii There is no unique definition of coastal zone. The European Environment Agency (EEA, 2006) offers the following: The coastal zone is interpreted as the resulting environment from the coexistence of two margins: coastal land defined as the terrestrial edge of continents, and coastal waters defined as the littoral section of shelf seas. Together they constitute a whole, which needs a specific methodological approach and dedicated management methods. Coastlines are determined from the Corine land cover data base (CLC). The terrestrial portion of the coastal zone is defined by an area extending 10 km landwards from the coastline. Where relevant, assessment of the basic coastal zone is enhanced by comparisons between the immediate coastal strip (up to 1 km), the coastal hinterland (coastal zone between 1 and 10 kilometre line) and the non-coastal national territory, called inland. The marine part of coastal zone is defined as a zone extending 10 km offshore (i.e. as in Natura2000 coverage analysis) or a variable zone of shelf sea depending on the issue analysed (e.g. navigation routes, territorial waters, fisheries, coastal dynamics). The generic term used is coastal zone, but coastal area, coast, coastal space and coastal systems are used synonymously to better accommodate the particular context.
iii Notes for Table 2 : Algeria. The 100-300 m limit is in built up areas. Otherwise the limit is 0.5 km between settlements that are of 3km coastal length. vii Discussions with Israeli researchers revealed considerable doubts about the quality of this study. Nevertheless we include it as one of the very few that provides orders of magnitude estimates from a Mediterranean state.
viii The study also adds local expenditures by the municipalities to provide cleaning services etc. of NIS145 million a year. In our view, however, this is not appropriate. These outlays are a cost of providing the services that the visitors enjoy, in which case it should be subtracted from their expenditures to arrive at a net willingness to pay. Since other estimates are not net values we have not made such a correction but equally we have not added the municipal expenditures to the visitors WTP.
ix Given that the Israeli study is not published in a peer reviewed journal we must not place too much weight on it. Nevertheless it is useful as a gudie to what are probably plausible values.
x T is now given as: T = α(X/N).V.N, where is the proportionality factor for a basic house. The resulting value is then α .X.V.
